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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

ADDITIONAL FACTS
1. In 1906, a major reduction in tribal land holdings occurred when the Coeur d’Alene

Reservation was allotted. In conjunction with allotment of the Reservation, Congress directed
the Secretary of the Interior “to sell or dispose of unalloted lands.” Act of June 21, 1906, 34
Stat. 325, 335. “The rationale for the policy [of selling surplus lands] was that most lands
remaining after allotment was completed were not needed by the tribes.” Cohen’s Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 613-14 (Renard Strickland ed. 1982).
The Tribe accuses the State of “overstat[ing] the effect of the Coeur d’Alene Allotment
Act” because while the Act caused the “Tribe to lose ownership of some land to individual
Indian allottees and non-Indian purchasers of surplus lands, the Tribe still retained the
Reservation’s unsold and unallotted land for its beneficial use.” Tribe Resp. Br. 36. This
statement, while facially true, omits to disclose that the unsold lands amounted to 12,878 acres,
or less than 4% of the 345,000 acres within the Reservation’s exterior boundaries. 1 As a result,
homesteaders occupied almost all of the land along the twelve tributary streams that provide
spawning and rearing habit for adfluvial fish species harvested in Coeur d’Alene Lake. See R.
2214 (1911 map showing land opened to homesteading). 2
The small amount of land held for the benefit of the Tribe along the twelve tributary
streams is a critical fact in this case. It is not an overstatement to assert that the Tribe owns little,
1

See Act of May 19, 1958, 72 Stat. 121 (restoring the unsold 12,878 acres to tribal
ownership). The Tribe also retained 4,140-5,220 acres of submerged lands under navigable
waterways as communal property. See R. 0548-49 (Affidavit of David B. Shaw).
2
Adfluvial fish species live in the Lake as adults, but travel up tributary streams to
spawn; juvenile fish either migrate to the Lake directly, or reside in the streams for several years
before returning to the Lake. R. 0577.
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and in many cases none, of the fish habitat that it seeks to preserve in the twelve non-navigable
streams. Indeed, the map that the Tribe filed under Protective Order, R. 3692, amply
demonstrates the lack of tribal lands along the twelve streams even after recent acquisitions of
land by the Tribe, many of which have not been taken into trust by the United States. 3
2. On those portions of the twelve streams owned by, or held in trust for, the Tribe, the
United States claims water for both instream flows and wetland maintenance. In the letter
accompanying its claims, the United States clarified that "[t]o the extent [the wetland] claims
concern riparian areas along streams subject to Instream Flow claims . . . the United States does
not intend to double a claim to the same surface water. Instead, the United States is providing
two separate justifications for the same water flows that provide instream fish habitat and support
riparian vegetation." R. 0011. If this Court determines that protection of fish habitat was a
primary purpose of the Reservation, the wetland maintenance claims will provide such protection
on those stream segments held in trust for the Tribe, regardless of what action this Court takes
with regard to the State’s assertion that the instream flow claims on the twelve streams
dominated by non-Indian lands should be dismissed.

II.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE 1887 AND 1889 AGREEMENTS SUPERSEDED THE 1873 EXECUTIVE ORDER AND
EMBODIED THE PARTIES’ UNDERSTANDING THAT PROMOTION OF AGRICULTURE WAS
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE REDUCED RESERVATION.

3

In United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984), the court did not consider
land “reacquired,” for purposes of implying reserved water rights, until the land had been
“reacquired by the Tribe and returned to trust status.” Id. at 1361 (emphasis added); see also In
re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d
76, 84, 114, (Wyo. 1988) (implying reserved water rights for lands “later reacquired, in trust for
the Tribes”).
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In 1873, the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was set aside by Executive Order, R. 2031, using
the boundaries specified in an unratified agreement with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe. R. 2141
(Agreement). In 1885, the Tribe sent a petition seeking negotiations so “that their present
reserve may be confirmed to them.” R. 2042. In 1887, the Tribe and the United States
negotiated an agreement to set aside the lands within the 1873 Executive Order Reservation “as
Indian land and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.” R. 2187. Congress expressed concern
about the extent of submerged lands included within the Reservation, R. 2055, and ordered new
negotiations. Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 980, 1002. “[T]he main purpose of the new
negotiations was to regain from the Tribe whatever submerged lands it was willing to sell.”
United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 1067, 1077 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000). The boundaries of the Coeur
d’Alene Reservation were diminished by an agreement concluded September 9, 1889, and the
1887 and 1889 Agreements were ratified in the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989, 1027. 4
The first question presented in this appeal is whether the 1887 and 1889 Agreements,
considered together, established new purposes for use of the Tribe’s diminished land base, or
simply ratified the purposes of the 1873 Executive Order. The purposes of the 1887 and 1889
Agreements, and the implications of such purposes for establishment of water rights, are
independent of the Tribe’s title to submerged lands under navigable waters within the
Reservation. As established in Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (Idaho II), Congress,
in its actions occurring before the date of statehood on July 3, 1890, recognized the inclusion of
submerged lands in the 1873 Reservation, and affirmed the Tribe’s title to such lands. Nothing
in the 1887 and 1889 Agreements altered such intent, because Congress, in its pre-statehood acts,
4

Contrary to the assertions of the United States and the Tribe, the term “diminish”
applies generally to any reduction in a Reservation’s boundaries. See United States v. Idaho, 95
F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1115 (D. Idaho 1998) (“[t]he northern boundary of the diminished reservation
was drawn so as to bisect the Lake”).
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had indicated its intent that “they remain tribal reservation lands barring agreement to the
contrary.” Id. at 280. Such agreement occurred in 1889, when the Tribe agreed to “cede the
northern portion of the reservation, including two-thirds of Lake Coeur d’Alene, in exchange for
$500,000.” Id. at 269-70.
Idaho II establishes that it was Congress’s intent that the submerged lands under Coeur
d’Alene Lake and the St. Joe River remain part of the Reservation. But, in reaching that
decision, the Court did not find it necessary to determine whether Congress, in approving the
1887 and 1889 Agreements, ratified the hunting and fishing purposes of the 1873 Executive
Order. As the United States points out (U.S. Resp. Br. 13-14), the State asserted in the Idaho II
litigation that no such ratification occurred. But the Court never resolved the issue, as explained
in more detail in the Ninth Circuit decision approved in Idaho II:
The State's argument that the district court should have determined the purpose of
the reservation as understood by Congress (rather than the Executive), and as so
understood in 1889 (rather than 1873) lacks support in the case law. In [United
States v.] Alaska, [521 U.S. 1 (1997)] where the Supreme Court relied heavily on
the purpose of the reserves at issue, the Court did not require either that Congress
itself apprehend the purpose or that the purpose be extant at the time of
congressional action. … What mattered was that Congress recognized that the
executive reservation included submerged lands, not that it knew or
acknowledged the executive purpose in reserving them. … Thus, it is irrelevant
that Congress may have believed the Tribe to have wholly or mainly converted to
an agricultural lifestyle by 1889.
United States v. Idaho, 210 F.3d at 1075-76 (emphasis added). Thus, the Idaho II courts never
determined whether the purposes of the diminished Reservation that remained after
implementation of the 1887 and 1889 Agreements were the same as those of the 1873 Executive
Order. It was not necessary because the submerged lands remained part of the Reservation
regardless of whether the parties to the Agreements intended hunting and fishing to be a primary
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purpose of the diminished Reservation or whether hunting and fishing were merely permitted
activities.
Given the holdings in Idaho II, this Court cannot infer an intent that hunting and fishing
remain a primary purpose of the Reservation merely because the diminished Reservation
included submerged lands. Determination of such purpose entails two inquiries: (1) did the
1891 Act supersede the prior Executive Order, and (2) if so, did the 1891 Act encourage reliance
on hunting and fishing, or merely permit hunting and fishing to continue within the 1891
boundaries?
1.

The Court Need Not Find an Intent to “Abrogate” the Earlier Purpose of
Hunting and Fishing in Order to Conclude that the Primary Purpose of the
1887 and 1889 Agreements was to Promote Agriculture.

The United States and the Tribe contest the notion that the 1887 and 1889 Agreements
supersede the 1873 Executive Order by asserting that the Executive Order could be superseded
only if Congress acted affirmatively to repudiate or abrogate it. See, e.g., Tribe Resp. Br. 10
(“[t]here is nothing in the text of the Agreements that could have been understood by the Tribe to
mean that those Agreements were abrogating the purposes of the Reservation”). In support of
this assertion, the Tribe cites the statement in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986),
which notes that the Court has traditionally “required that Congress' intention to abrogate Indian
treaty rights be clear and plain.” Dion and the cases cited therein, however, address unilateral
congressional extinguishment of rights guaranteed to a tribe by treaty or agreement. Here, the
1887 and 1889 Agreements were not unilateral congressional actions—they were negotiated at
arms-length with tribal leaders who demonstrated sophisticated bargaining techniques. Because
the parties were acting for their mutual benefit, the concept of unilateral abrogation is simply
inapplicable. Instead, the proper path is to apply the normal canons of construction applicable to
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agreements with Indian tribes. Doing so, it is obvious that the parties mutually agreed to
encourage agricultural uses on the reserved lands. In contrast, while the Tribe retained the
implied right to hunt and fish on its lands, such activities were not affirmatively encouraged,
either on the face of the Agreements or in the discussions leading thereto. In similar
circumstances, other courts have concluded that primary purposes were those affirmatively
encouraged by agreement with the Tribe, and secondary purposes are those activities merely
permitted within the Reservation. See Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 97, (finding hunting to be merely a
permissive use of reservation lands even in the face of a treaty provision mentioning hunting).
Moreover, it is hardly revolutionary to suggest that the purposes of a Reservation should
be established by looking to agreements made with the Tribe rather than preceding executive
orders. This principle was acknowledged, in City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 145 Idaho 497, 180 P.3d
1048 (2008), which held that the cession of a portion of the Fort Hall Reservation and
accompanying federal legislation did not include a grant water rights. The Fort Hall Reservation
was initially set aside by executive order in 1867, and “[t]he boundaries and terms of the
Reservation were established the next year in the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger. Id. at 498, 180
P.3d at 1049. Despite the earlier executive order, the Court acknowledged that “the Tribe in this
case impliedly received the water rights necessary to sustain the purposes of their reservation
with the treaty establishing the Reservation.” Id. at 507, 180 P.3d at 1058.
City of Pocatello acknowledges that when the United States and a tribe enter into an
agreement addressing the purpose and use of reservation lands the terms of that agreement
establish the purposes mutually agreed upon by the parties. And, as shown in Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), such examination is particularly appropriate when the agreement is
the result of a “change in conditions” affecting the Tribe’s livelihood. Id. at 576.
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Here, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements did not merely affirm and continue rights conferred
by the 1873 Executive Order, but provided affirmatively that from that point forward the
Reservation would “be held forever as Indian lands and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene
Indians,” with no part to “ever be sold, occupied, open to white settlement, or otherwise disposed
of without the consent of the Indians residing on said reservation. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat.
989, 1028. While these provisions were later abrogated by Congress, infra at 11-12, they
nonetheless represented a fundamental change in the Reservation’s status, particularly when
coupled with the Tribe’s understanding, as expressed by Chief Seltice, that what the Tribe
wanted “preserved forever” was “our homes . . . our houses [and] our farms.” R. 2157.
Together, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements identify the uses of land that the parties to the
Agreements mutually encouraged. In such a case, the seminal decision in Winters establishes
that intent to reserve water must rest on such purposes. As discussed at length in the State’s
opening brief, the Winters decision examined the purposes of the Fort Belknap Reservation by
looking to the terms of an agreement with the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes (ratified in the
Act of May 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 113), which established a reduced reservation for the Tribes within
the boundaries of an earlier, larger, reservation. The purposes of the reduced Fort Belknap
reservation were clearly agricultural, while the purpose of the earlier, larger reservation had been
to provide for the Tribes’ hunting and fishing needs. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 (describing
the earlier reservation as a “larger tract . . . adequate for the habits and wants of a nomadic and
uncivilized people”). The Court ignored the purposes of the earlier reservation, and determined
the purposes of the Fort Belknap Reservation solely by reference to the 1888 Agreement. 207
U.S. at 575 (“[t]he case, as we view it, turns on the agreement of May, 1888”). The Court’s
reasons were at least partially explained in another decision, where the Court held that the
ownership of mineral rights in the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, which, like Fort Belknap, had
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been carved out of the same earlier and more expansive reservation, rested “entirely on the
agreements or conventions [establishing a new reservation] which were ratified and given effect
by Congress” because the executive orders establishing the earlier reservation were “designed to
be temporary” and were “superseded by congressional action and no longer are of any force.”
British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159, 163 (1936).
The United States asserts that:
[I]f the State were correct that a court should look instead to the last federal action
that changed the boundaries of a reservation when determining the scope of a
water right for that reservation, the Winters Court would have considered an 1895
agreement (ratified in 1896) between the United States and the Fort Belknap
Tribes that reduced the boundaries of the reservation. See Gros Ventre Tribe v.
United States, 469 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing the Grinnell
Agreement).
U.S. Resp. Br. 22.
Unquestionably, the Winters court, in determining the purposes of the Fort Belknap
Reservation, looked to the agreement ratified in the 1888 Act, and not the 1895 Grinnel
Agreement. This is so because the 1888 Agreement, unlike the 1895 Grinnell Agreement, was a
change in circumstances that included language clearly establishing the agricultural purposes of
the reduced reservation by, among other things, directing that money received from the cession
of lands be used to buy livestock and agricultural implements, to assist Indians in enclosing their
farms, and “to promote [Tribes’] civilization, comfort, and improvement.” Act of May 1, 1888,
Art. III, 25 Stat. 113, 114. The 1888 Agreement also directed that preference in distribution of
goods be given to Indians “who in good faith undertake the cultivation of the soil. Id. at Art. V,
25 Stat. at 114-15. The 1895 Grinnel Agreement (ratified in the Act of June 10, 1896, 29 Stat.
321, 350) ceded additional lands, but did not alter the purposes of the reservation—indeed, it
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simply confirmed those purposes by repeating, practically word for word, the language in the
1888 Agreement encouraging agriculture. 5
In short, Winters, by relying on the 1888 Agreement, applied the principle that earlier
legislation or executive action is superseded by “the enactment of subsequent comprehensive
legislation establishing elaborate inclusions and exclusions of the person, thing, and relationships
ordinarily associated with that subject.” Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 23:13 (6th ed. 2002). Likewise, the 1891 Act, in approving the 1887 and 1889 Agreements
with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, superseded earlier actions by comprehensively addressing, in the
only documents agreed to by both the Tribe and the United States, the purposes to be served by
the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.
2.

Intent to Supersede the 1873 Executive Order is Apparent in the Text and
History of the 1887 and 1889 Agreements.

The Claimants attempt to avoid the fact that the 1887 and 1889 Agreements are the
seminal agreements with the Tribe by asserting that the 1873 Executive Order incorporated the
unratified 1873 Agreement. Even if this were true, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements still
superseded the earlier agreement. The parties to the 1887 and 1889 Agreements did not set out
to revise the earlier agreement; rather, they negotiated a comprehensive replacement, as can be
seen in the record of the 1887 negotiations. The commissioners who negotiated the 1887

5

Compare Act of May 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 113, and Act of June 10, 1896, 29 Stat. 321, 350
(Grinnel Agreement). Article III of the 1888 Agreement and Article II of the Grinnel Agreement
include practically identical directives regarding the expenditure of cession proceeds to buy
livestock and agricultural implements, to assist Indians in enclosing their farms, and to promote
the Tribes’ civilization and improvement. 25 Stat. at 114; 29 Stat. at 351. Article V of the 1888
Agreement, directing that preference in distribution of goods be given to Indians “who in good
faith undertake the cultivation of the soil, 25 Stat. at 114-15, is repeated word-for-word in Article
IV of the Grinnel Agreement. 29 Stat. at 351.
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Agreement were furnished a copy of the 1873 Agreement, R. 2141, and obviously used it as a
model: both agreements establish a reservation with identical boundaries; cede all aboriginal
territory outside that reservation in return for payment; promise to construct a saw and grist mill;
and promise to provide “articles of comfort and civilization” (1873) or “articles as shall best
promote the progress, comfort, improvement, education, and civilization of said Coeur d’Alene
Indians (1887). R. 1865-66 (1873 Agreement); R. 2187-89 (1887 Agreement). One glaring
omission, however, occurs in the 1887 Agreement: the parties did not include the provision from
the 1873 Agreement stating that “the waters running into said reservation shall not be turned
from their natural channel where they enter said reservation.” R. 1865.
The omission of the provision is significant: “[i]t is a rule of law that where a revising
statute, or one enacted for another, omits provisions contained in the original act, the parts
omitted cannot be kept in force by construction, but are annulled.” Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493,
502 (1870). The 1887 Agreement was clearly enacted in place of the unratified 1873
Agreement, yet, the district court, by construction, interpreted the purposes of the Reservation to
incorporate the earlier, superseded provision. See R. 4322 (citing 1873 provision to “establish
that one primary purpose of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was to provide the Tribe with the
important waterways needed to facilitate its traditional hunting and fishing practices”).
The district court’s error in not fully considering the import of the omission of the
“running waters” provision from the 1887 Agreement was exacerbated by the fact that Congress
delayed ratification of the 1887 Agreement until it was able to obtain a cession of many of those
same “important waterways” that the district court concluded were a primary purpose of the
Reservation. R. 4322. Together, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements, combined with the lack of any
mention of hunting and fishing needs in either the 1887 or 1889 negotiations, and the repeated
reference in such negotiations by federal commissioners and tribal representatives of the need to
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protect tribal farmlands, 6 establishes that the primary purpose of the Reservation that the Tribe
ultimately bargained-for was to fulfill the Tribe’s agricultural needs.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DISALLOW INSTREAM FLOW
CLAIMS WHERE THE PLACE OF USE IS ON NON-INDIAN FEE LAND.
Ultimately, with regard to the majority of the instream flow claims, it is not necessary for

the Court to determine whether the 1891 Act superseded the purposes of the 1873 Executive
Order, because 15 years later, in 1906, Congress ordered that the Reservation be allotted, and the
surplus lands sold in fee simple to non-Indians. Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325. Ninth
Circuit case law establishes that the 1906 Act abrogated property rights previously reserved for
the Tribe. In the case of Nicodemus v. Washington Water Power Co., 264 F.2d 614 (1959), the
court was asked to determine whether the Power Company could condemn an easement across a
tribal allotment. The allottee argued that condemnation of the easement violated the terms of
Article 5 of the 1887 Agreement guaranteeing “no part of said reservation shall ever be sold,
occupied, open to white settlement, or otherwise disposed of without the consent of the Indians
residing on said reservation.” Id. at 616 (quoting Art. 5).
The court held that the allotment “in earlier times was part of the reservation, but
following the 1906 Act, was “not part of the reservation, nor is it tribal land,” so that the
allotment was “not land subject to the treaty [i.e., the 1887 Agreement].” Id. at 617. The court

6

During the 1887 negotiations, Chief Seltice stated that the things the Tribe wanted
“preserved forever” were “our homes . . . our houses . . . our fences, our farms, our schoolhouses, our churches.” R. 2157. In an earlier petition to their Indian agent, Chief Seltice and
other tribal leaders expressed concerns about rumors that “whites were getting up a petition to
have the government open the very best portion of our reservation & send us to the other side of
the St. Joseph river,” and asserted that “[f]rom the land they would take away, we get our food,
our clothing, & whatever we are in need of[.] For we till our land, raise crops, keep herds of
cattle & thus provide for ourselves.” R. 3399-3400.
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viewed the 1906 Act as a “change in status,” allowable because “the plenary power of Congress
over Indian tribes and tribal property cannot be limited by treaties so as to prevent repeal or
amendment by later statute.” Id. at 617. Because the allotment was no longer subject to the
provisions in the 1887 Agreement, Congress was free to authorize condemnation of an easement
without tribal consent. Id. at 617.
Nicodemus establishes that the 1906 Act was a fundamental change in the Reservation, so
that tribal property rights in allotted and surplus lands are determined by the 1906 Act and
related legislation, not by the earlier agreements with the Tribe. Admittedly, the court’s
statement that the allotment was no longer “part of the Reservation” was hyperbolic (though
recently cited by another court as authority 7), but the basic holding of Nicodemus remains intact:
communal property rights conferred or reserved for the Tribe in earlier agreements were
abrogated by the allotment of the Reservation and the sale of surplus lands. Indeed, any other
outcome would be at odds with the purpose underlying allotment and sale of surplus lands,
which was to make all parcels “fully alienable and free of all charge or incumbrance
whatsoever.” Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328
(2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If allotments held in trust for tribal
members cease to be “tribal land,” Nicodemus, 264 F.2d at 617, the same must be true for lands
conveyed to non-Indians, and to water rights whose claimed place of use is on those conveyed
lands.

7

See United States v. Newmont USA Ltd., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1065-66 (E.D. Wash.
2007) (quoting Nicodemus, 264 F.2d at 618 for the proposition that “[o]nce allotted in severalty,
the land was ‘no longer a part of the reservation, nor [was] it tribal land.’”) (addressing land in
the Spokane Reservation).
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1.

The Place of Use for Instream Flow Claims is the Fish Habitat That the
Claims Seek to Protect, Not the Downstream Waterways Where Fishing
Occurs.

There are twelve non-navigable streams tributary to Coeur d’Alene Lake and the St. Joe
River that provide spawning and rearing habitat for adfluvial fish harvested in the Lake. 8 When
the Reservation was allotted and opened to non-Indian homesteading in 1906 the lands
underlying these streams, with the exception of a few scattered parcels, were conveyed in fee to
non-Indians—the Tribe only retained ownership of submerged lands underlying downstream
navigable waters—namely a portion of Coeur d’Alene Lake, the lower St. Joe River, and a
portion of Black Lake. If this Court concludes that a primary purpose of the Reservation was to
preserve tribal ownership of fish habitat in Reservation waterways, it must then address the
consequences of the fact that such ownership did not survive the allotment and opening of the
Reservation.
Central to this issue is the nature of the fish habitat water rights claimed by the United
States and the Tribe. The United States attempts to downplay the fact that the twelve tributary
streams flow primarily, and in some cases exclusively, through non-Indian lands. In the United
States’ view, “the lands to which the instream flow rights at issue here are linked are the

8

For the reasons explained in the State’s opening brief, this argument is addressed to the
twelve streams that are tributary to Coeur d’Alene Lake and the St. Joe River: Claim Nos. 9210906 (Cherry Creek), 92-10907 (Alder Creek), 94-9244 (Black Creek), 94-9425 (Willow
Creek), 94-9246 (Evans Creek), 95-16678 (Fighting Creek), 95-16679 (Lake Creek), 95-16680
(Plummer Creek), 95-16681 (Little Plummer Creek), 95-16682 (Pedee Creek), 95-16683
(Benewah Creek), and 95-16684 (Windfall Creek). Two other claims for Hangman Creek, Nos.
93-7469 and 93-7470, include substantial stream reaches held in trust for the Tribe or tribal
members, and may require additional fact-finding to determine the applicability of any holding
this Court may reach regarding the reservation of instream flows on non-tribal lands. Because
the Tribe owns the submerged lands under the lower St. Joe River, any holding based on the
extinguishment of tribal title to streambeds would not apply to Claim No. 91-7777.
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downstream Tribal lands where the Tribe conducts its fishing, not the lands across which the
waters flow.” U.S. Resp. Br. 26 n.10. It then asserts that “[i]t is this use of water by the fish
species subject to the Tribe’s on-Reservation fishing right, and not title to land, that supports a
claim to impliedly-reserved water rights under Winters.” U.S. Resp. Br. 28. See also U.S. Resp.
Br. 26 (“[t]hese claims are premised on the biological needs of a downstream fishery, not on
underlying or abutting land ownership”).
In other words, the United States and Tribe attempt to portray the fish habitat claims as a
“downstream” water right appurtenant to the tribal lands underlying Coeur d’Alene Lake, and
assert that “a junior water right holder upstream [cannot] by virtue of land ownership, . . . stop
the water flowing over his or her land from satisfying the downstream senior right.” Tribe Resp.
Br. 31. Using this convoluted logic, the Tribe asserts that the claimed “water right does not
require the use of alienated land,” but merely requires the land owners to allow the water to flow
downstream. Tribe Resp. Br. 29; see also U.S. Resp. Br. 25 (instream flow claims “derive from
the Tribe’s uncontested right to fish in Lake Coeur d’Alene and other downstream waterways”);
U.S. Resp. Br. 26 (“[t]hese claims are premised on the biological needs of a downstream
fishery”) (emphasis added).
The reality, however, is that the place of use for these water rights is not the downstream
tribal waters where the Tribe may exercise its fishing rights. The place of use is upstream, on
those waterways flowing over private lands. This is stated on the face of the claims: the fish
habitat claim for Plummer Creek (R. 6110), identifies the place of use as “all points along the
stream reach located between the [stated] boundaries.” The United States acknowledges that it is
claiming “in situ water rights [that] allow for the Tribe’s continued traditional activities on
Reservation waters, which require protecting the upstream habitat upon which the Tribe’s fishery
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depends.” U.S. Resp. Br. 6; see also U.S. Resp. Br. 2 (claims “maintain[] biological
requirements of certain fish species that migrate upstream from Lake Coeur d’Alene to spawn”).
By definition, the “upstream habitat” that the United States seeks to protect includes both
the water and the underlying land. Federal regulations define “essential fish habitat” to include
“those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, feeding, or growth to
maturity,” with “substrate” further defined to include “sediment, hard bottom, structures
underlying the waters, and associated biological communities.” 50 C.F.R. § 600.10.
In sum, any analysis of the fish habitat claims must start from the premise that the place
of use for the claims is not the tribally-owned lakebed where fishing occurs, but the non-Indian
land on which the fish habitat is present. By analogy, the Tribe could not claim a reserved water
right to irrigate non-Indian lands if crops raised thereon were eventually consumed by the Tribe.
Likewise, the Tribe cannot claim a water right to spawn and rear fish on lands not held in trust
for the Tribe merely because those fish eventually migrate to a water body where the Tribe may
harvest them.
2.

The Place of Use for a Reserved Water Right Must be Reserved for the
Tribe’s Use.

Because the place of use for the 12 fish habitat claims is the stream bed in which the fish
are reared, and not the Lake where fish are harvested, the burden is on the United States to
demonstrate that the stream bed is either held in trust for the Tribe, or is subject to a servitude
allowing continued entry and use of the stream bed for either fishing or rearing of fish. The mere
fact that water was reserved for fishing and fish habitat when the Reservation was first set aside
for the Tribe’s exclusive use in 1873 is not sufficient because rights implied by the setting aside
of land for a Tribe’s exclusive use “must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those
lands.” Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 561 (1981).
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Here, the 1906 Act provides on its face that lands opened to non-Indian homesteading
were no longer reserved for the Tribe’s use. The Act identifies the opened lands as “residue or
surplus lands—that is, lands not allotted or reserved for Indian school, agency, or other
purposes.” 34 Stat. at 336. It then provides that a maximum of three sections (1,920 acres)
could be reserved for “agency, school and religious purposes.” Id. at 337. This express
limitation on “reserved” lands confirms that all lands declared to be “residue or surplus” were
not reserved for tribal use. This is additionally confirmed by the provision providing that “all
coal or oil deposits in or under the lands on the said reservation shall be and remain the property
of the United States.” Id. at 336. The reservation of a specific incident of title implies that all
other incidents of title were not reserved.
The 1906 Act is consistent with the general principle that although alienated lands may
remain part of the Reservation for jurisdictional purposes, all property rights incident to title are
extinguished upon conveyance to non-Indians, unless reserved explicitly. See Montana, 450
U.S. at 565 (conveyance to non-Indians “divested” tribe of right to prevent taking of wildlife);
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 689 (1993); (loss of title “abrogated” right to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Indians); Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1981)
(conveyance of reservation lands to non-Indians “cut off or destroyed” tribe’s right to enter to
hunt and fish).
The United States and the Tribe assert that cases discussing tribal loss of regulatory
authority over non-Indian lands are irrelevant, but such assertion ignores the fact that tribal
regulatory authority is an incident of property ownership and the right to exclude. Montana, 450
U.S. at 554. As such, the cases confirm the general principle that loss of title to reservation lands
includes all incidents of title unless reserved explicitly. Moreover, the decision in Montana
presented a claim analogous to the United States’ claim that the right to fish on tribal lands
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includes the incidental right to prevent dewatering of fish habitat on private lands. In Montana,
the Court recognized that after opening of the reservation, the Crow Tribe retained the right to
hunt and fish on lands reserved for the Tribe’s use. Id. at 558. As the United States does here,
the Tribe asserted that its retained hunting right included the ancillary right to protect the wildlife
while on non-Indian lands. Id. at 564-65. The Court’s rejection of the asserted, ancillary right is
equally applicable here: the Tribe’s right to fish on tribally-owned waterways does not imply the
right to protect fish, or by extension fish habitat, once those fish leave tribal lands.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has not limited the loss of incidental rights to regulatory
rights: the Court has held that other incidental property rights, such as the “right to fish free of
state interference,” are lost when reservation land is alienated to non-Indians. Puyallup Tribe,
Inc. v. Dept. of Game of State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 174 (1977) (Puyallup III). Likewise, the
Ninth Circuit has held that the alienation of reservation lands to non-Indians abrogates the
incidental property right of entry to hunt or fish. Blake, 663 F.2d at 911. The same principle
applies to reserved water rights: once land “is conveyed to a homesteader, the purposes for which
Winters rights were implied are eliminated,” because the conveyed land is no longer subject to
tribal use. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d. 1358, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1984). This principle
was applied in the Big Horn adjudication, where the court, discussing reserved water rights for
irrigation, held that the “[w]hen the Tribes ceded their land to the United States for sale, the
reserved water right disappeared because the purpose for which it was recognized no longer
pertained.”). In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 899 P.2d 848, 854 (Wyo. 1995).
To counter this overwhelming precedent, the United States and the Tribe cite two cases,
State v. McConville, 65 Idaho 46, 139 P.2d 485 (Idaho 1943), and Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), as support for the assertion that when lands are sold in fee to
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non-Indians, the Tribe retains the right to use such lands as necessary to achieve the purposes of
the Reservation unless Congress acts explicitly to abrogate such rights. Tribe Resp. Br. 35-36;
U.S. Resp. Br. 26, 29. Both cases are easily distinguished. In McConville, this Court was not
addressing an implied fishing right, but rather an express treaty fishing right that, as the Court
noted, was explicitly reserved “in full force and effect” by the Act opening the Nez Perce
Reservation to non-Indian settlement. 65 Idaho at 51, 139 P.2d at 487 (quoting Art. XI of Act of
Aug. 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 331). No analogous reservation of rights appears in the 1906 Act
opening the Coeur d’Alene Reservation to homesteading.
In Menominee Tribe of Indians, the question presented was whether the Tribe’s hunting
and fishing rights, implied from the setting aside of a reservation for the Tribe’s exclusive use,
survived the termination of the Wolf River Reservation. The Menominee Termination Act was
unique, however, in that the former reservation lands were conveyed in fee simple to the Tribe.
391 U.S. at 408-09. Thus, the Menominee Tribe continued to own and occupy the same land
before and after the Termination Act, and the only question was whether Congress had abrogated
the Tribe’s right to hunt, free of state regulation, on land owned by the Tribe.
Neither McConville nor Menominee contradict cases holding that the conveyance of
reservation lands to non-Indians without a reservation of rights is an explicit indication of
congressional intent to abrogate incidental property rights implied from the setting aside of lands
for a tribe’s exclusive use. In such cases, the Supreme Court has held that conveyance of tribal
lands to non-Indians is an “abrogation” of the “right of exclusive use and occupation,” and “[t]he
abrogation of this greater right” implies the loss of rights implied from the reservation of
exclusive use. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 688-89 (discussing loss of implied right of regulatory
authority); see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (congressional act
directing sale of reservation’s surplus lands despite earlier treaty requiring tribal consent to any
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sale was exercise of congress’ power to abrogate treaty provisions). Likewise, in Blake v. Arnett,
663 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 1981), the court concluded that the tribe’s fishing right, implied by
the setting aside of land for the tribe’s exclusive use, was extinguished on those reservation lands
sold to non-Indians. Tellingly, the court rejected the tribal members’ argument that the holding
in Menominee compelled the conclusion that their fishing rights survived on alienated lands. Id.
Here, the Tribe attempts to avoid the consequences of alienation by analogizing its claims
to the State’s possession of minimum stream flow water rights, which include water flowing over
land the State does not own. State minimum stream flows do not, by implication, support the
Tribe’s claims, because the State’s police powers over water and fish are not limited to lands
owned by the State. “‘[P]rotection of the wild life of the State is peculiarly within the police
power, and the State has great latitude in determining what means are appropriate for its
protection.” Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 391 (1978) (quoting
Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545, 552 (1924). “[A] State's power to
regulate the use of water in times and places of shortage . . . is at the core of its police power.”
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353, 366 n.6 (1992);
Speer v. Stephenson, 16 Idaho 707, 712, 102 P. 365, 367 (1909) (Idaho Constitution “reserv[es]
to the state the right to regulate and control the manner and means of appropriating the
unappropriated waters of the state”). In contrast, a tribe’s power to regulate the use of natural
resources arises from its power to exclude: when title to reservation lands is conveyed in fee to
non-Indians, tribal authority to restrict use of the resources for purposes of conservation
generally ceases. Montana, 450 U.S. at 558-59; see also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438, 456 (1997) (a tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction is generally limited to lands over which tribe
can “assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude”). Hence, the fact that the State may,
through its police powers, conserve waters flowing over private land does not support the Tribe’s
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claims; if anything, it demonstrates why they must be denied. The United States and Tribe
nonetheless press this Court to craft an exception for non-consumptive fish habitat water rights
flowing exclusively, or nearly so, through non-Indian lands. The precedents they cite do not
support such a radical expansion of the reserved water rights doctrine. Fish habitat water rights
have been recognized only where the tribe had an underlying property right, either in the form of
ownership or a servitude, to use the stream at the designated place of use for fishing or fish
rearing.
For example, in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, the Tribe “claim[ed] a reserved
right for water to maintain the spawning grounds in the creek.” 460 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1325
(E.D. Wash. 1978). The spawning grounds were in the lower section of the creek. See Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton 647 F.2d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[t]he Indians cultivated No
Name Creek's lower reach to establish spawning grounds”). The court took care to note that the
lower section of the creek ran through three allotments held in trust by the United States “that
had never passed from tribal ownership” 647 F.2d at 45 n.5; see also 460 F. Supp. at 1336 (map
of lower allotments). The award of water was only to “maintain the spawning grounds.” 460 F.
Supp. 2d at 1325. No water was awarded to protect habitat on those portions of the creek
running through private lands. Thus, Walton is consistent with the premise that the place of use
for an instream flow must be either owned by a tribe or subject to a servitude allowing tribal use
of the stream bed for fishing or fish rearing.
Reliance on United States v. Anderson as precedent for decreeing instream flow water
rights to preserve fish habitat on non-Indian lands is likewise misplaced. Anderson affirmed a
reserved water right “needed to preserve fishing in the creek below Chamokane Falls.” 591 F.
Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Wash. 1982). The reach in question was a mile and a half in length. Id. at 4.
The appellate decision indicates that “land owned in fee occupied most of the waterfront
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property within the reservation,” 736 F.2d 1358, 1366 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984). The reported
Anderson decisions do not identify whether the Tribe retained ownership of the creek bed (as
opposed to the “waterfront” property), but an earlier, unreported decision in the case found that
the “Spokanes had reserved the exclusive right to take fish from the part of Chamokane Creek
contained within the reservation.” 9
Thus, at a minimum, the Tribe retained a property right, in the form of a servitude, 10
reserving the exclusive right to take fish from Chamokane Creek, and the place of use for the
water right was limited to the lower reach where the tribal fishing right was exercised. 591 F.
Supp. at 5 (“the flow from the Falls into Lower Chamokane Creek must be sufficient to maintain
the water temperature at 68°F or below”). Thus, Anderson does not support the award of
instream flows along stream reaches where the place of use is not subject to a servitude allowing
entry and use for tribal fishing.
The case that is perhaps most irrelevant to the current claims is United States v. Adair,
723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983). The court recognized an instream flow fish habitat water right on
a river that flowed primarily through non-Indian (though mostly federally-held) lands within the
terminated Klamath Indian Reservation. The basis for the court’s decision recognizing instream
flows independent of tribal ownership were two provisions in the Klamath Termination Act
explicitly preserving on former tribal lands all fishing rights and water rights held by the Tribe
pursuant to earlier treaties:

9

United States v. Anderson, No. 72-cv-3643, Memorandum Opinion and Order (E.D.
Wash., July 23, 1979). A copy of the relevant portions of the Memorandum Opinion is included
in the Addendum to this brief.
10
See United States v Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (treaty right preserving right to
fish at usual and accustomed places “imposed a servitude upon every piece of land as though
described therein”).
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(a) Nothing in this Act shall abrogate any water rights of the tribe and its
members . . . .
(b) Nothing in this Act shall abrogate any fishing rights or privileges of the tribe
or the members thereof enjoyed under Federal treaty.
Act of Aug. 13, 1954, §14, 68 Stat. 718, 722. 11
In Adair, the State of Oregon argued that “recognition of a reserved water right to sustain
the Tribe's hunting and fishing rights would impose a servitude or limitation on the use of former
reservation lands in contravention of the Termination Act policy of unencumbered sale.” 723
F.2d at 1411. The court, citing the Termination Act’s express disclaimer of intent to abrogate
water rights, rejected the argument that termination of tribal ownership extinguished water rights
for hunting and fishing:
Appellants' argument, however, overlooks the substantive language of the
Termination Act, the canons of construction for legislation affecting Indian
Tribes, and the implications of our decision in Kimball I. 12 Section 564m(a) of
the Termination Act provides, “[n]othing in sections 564–564w of this title shall
abrogate any water rights of the tribe and its members.” 25 U.S.C. § 564m(a)
(1976). This provision admits no exception, nor can it be read to exclude reserved
water rights. Congress presumably was aware of the importance of such rights to
Indian tribes at the time it drafted section 564m of the Klamath Termination Act.
A conclusion that the Termination Act ended the Klamath’s hunting and fishing
water rights would impute to Congress the intention to abrogate rights guaranteed
to the Tribe in the 1864 Treaty. As the Supreme Court noted in Menominee Tribe
v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 1711, 20 L.Ed.2d 697 (1968),
it is “difficult to believe that Congress, without explicit statement, would subject
the United States to a claim for compensation by destroying property rights
conferred by treaty.” Because Congress in section 564m of the Termination Act
explicitly protected tribal water rights and nowhere in the Act explicitly denied
them, we can only conclude that such rights survived termination.
11

The Adair decision refers to this provision by its then-existing codification, 25 U.S.C.

§ 564m.
12

In Kimball I (Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974)), the court had
determined that the treaty reservation of the exclusive right to fish within the Reservation
“include[d], in addition, a grant of exclusive hunting and trapping rights.” Adair, 723 F.2d at
1409.
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Adair, 723 F.2d at 1412 (additional citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court’s repeated
citation of the provision disclaiming intent to abrogate water rights demonstrates that the
provision was central to the court’s holding. Such provision overcame the general principle that
sales of reservation land to non-Indians are intended to “make perfect title to purchasers,” Ash
Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1920), so that no tribal property rights are
retained on conveyed lands.
Contrary to the arguments of the United States and the Tribe, the holding in Adair does
not support the assertion that reserved water rights for hunting and fishing would survive
allotment and opening of a reservation to non-Indian homesteading. While a quarter of the
Klamath Reservation had been allotted, 723 F.2d at 1398, with some allotments later sold to nonIndians, the Reservation had never been opened to homesteading. Thus, the Adair court never
had occasion to determine whether an act opening a reservation to homesteading would preserve
water rights for hunting and fishing if such act lacked an express reservation of water rights
analogous to that in the Termination Act. Moreover, the holding in Adair that water rights were
retained for hunting and fishing throughout the terminated reservation was partially based on an
earlier decision holding that the Termination Act preserved hunting and fishing rights on all
former reservation lands, including allotments that had been earlier conveyed to non-Indians.
In the earlier case, Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kimball II) the
court distinguished the holding in Puyallup III that fishing rights implied from the reservation of
lands for a tribe’s exclusive use are lost upon sale of allotments to non-Indians, citing the
provisions in the Klamath Termination Act that preserved hunting and fishing rights “on the
lands constituting the ancestral Klamath Indian Reservation.” Id. at 774. In short, the court
concluded that the Tribe retained hunting and fishing rights on all former reservation lands, with
no distinction between hunting rights on former allotments and hunting rights on lands acquired
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through the Termination Act, other than to note that on private lands the hunting right would be
non-exclusive. Id. The Kimball II holding explains the subsequent holding in Adair recognizing
instream flows throughout the ancestral reservation without regard to land ownership, because
“even where the Tribe transfers the land to which the hunting and fishing water rights might be
said to be appurtenant, it is the Tribe and its members, not some third party, that retains the right
to hunt and fish and needs water to support that right.” 723 F.2d at 1418 n.31. Because the
opening of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation lacks any provisions similar to those in the Klamath
Termination Act preserving hunting and fishing rights on former tribal lands, the reasoning of
the Adair court is inapplicable here.
Because Adair applied provisions unique to the Termination Act, the decision in Blake v.
Arnett, 663 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1981), provides better guidance on whether rights implied from
the primary purpose of a reservation survive the opening of the reservation to homesteading.
Blake addressed the Klamath River Indian Reservation in California. The Reservation, which
extended “one mile in width on each side of the Klamath river for a distance of approximately 20
miles up river,” was clearly set aside for the purpose of providing fishing access to the Klamath
River, although the Executive Order creating the Reservation made no mention of fishing rights.
Id. at 911. Earlier litigation had held that the right to fish was implied from the purposes of the
Reservation. Arnett v. Five Gill Nets, 121 Cal. Rptr. 906, 911 (Ct. App. 1975).
Despite the clear tie between the implied fishing right and the primary purpose of the
Reservation, the court held that once the reservation was allotted, and surplus lands opened to
homesteading, the Tribe’s right to use the lands for the reservation’s fishing purpose was
extinguished. 663 F.2d. at 910. In so holding, the court rejected the tribe’s assertion that it
retained “some interest in the lands now held” by non-Indians, whether in the “form of an
equitable servitude” or other encumbrance. Id.
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Blake is dispositive. Once the twelve streams on the Coeur d’Alene Reservation were
alienated to homesteaders, the Tribe lost the right to use those lands to fulfill the purposes of the
Reservation, a fact the United States and the Tribe do not dispute. 13 If the Tribe lost the right to
use the stream bed (which is a critical part of fish habitat) to fulfill reservation purposes, it
likewise lost any water right implied by those same purposes. If anything, this principle was
affirmed in Adair. The retention of a fishing right on former reservation lands meant those lands
could still be used to fulfill the reservation’s hunting and fishing purposes. But, “[w]here the
Tribe transfers lands without reserving the right to hunt and fish on it, there is no longer any
basis for a hunting and fishing water right.” Adair, 723 F.2d at 1418 n.31.
In short, a water right may be implied to fulfill reservation purposes on alienated lands
only where the Tribe retains the right to enter and use the place of use for one of the
reservation’s primary purposes. Nothing in Adair, Anderson or Walton suggests that retention of
a tribal right to fish in a downstream waterway reserves all upstream fish habitat, and associated
water rights, for the Tribe’s use. To so hold would essentially reverse the implied-reservationof-water doctrine to imply a right to use underlying land based on a reservation of water rights,
rather than implying a right to use water based on a reservation of land.
The remaining cases cited by the United States and the Tribe in support of instream flow
water rights on non-tribal lands are distinguishable for the same reasons discussed in the State’s
response brief in Appeal Nos. 45382 and 45383, and are only addressed summarily here. To
13

U.S. Resp. Br. at 32 (“the instream flow rights claimed here are not based on any
purported right to fish on private land. These rights are claimed to support fish populations
harvested by the Tribe on tribal lands only”); Tribe Resp. Br. 38 (“this case does not involve
issues related to a right of access or any other property interest on non-Indian land. As discussed
above, the Tribe claims a non-consumptive use right to maintain instream flows in water that
flows over non-Indian land to support fish habitat for the fish the Tribe harvests on Tribal land
within the Reservation”).
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start, reliance on Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th
Cir. 1985), is misplaced. The decision upheld a federal district court’s retained authority under a
prior consent decree to order the temporary release from a federal irrigation project to prevent
dewatering of 60 salmon redds. Id. at 1033-35. No reserved water rights were recognized or
awarded.
Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1964), does not support the award of water
rights on non-tribal lands. The Court awarded water rights for the Cocopah Indian Reservation,
a portion of which was two miles from the Colorado River, but, another part of the reservation
was “bordered on the west by the meander line of the Colorado River as shown by a public land
survey made in 1874.” R. 2938 (Solicitor Opinion); R. 3495 (plat showing Reservation bordering
Colorado River meander line). Moreover, the place of use, unlike here, was held by the United
States in trust for the tribe.
In Dep’t. of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrig. Dist., 850 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1993), (the
appeal from the Acquavella Adjudication), the court recognized a reservation of water rights for
fish habitat on off-reservation lands, but such recognition was the result of an agreement among
“[a]ll the parties to this litigation that the Yakima Indians . . . were entitled to water for the
preservation of fishing rights.” Id. at 1317. Also, the Tribe retained a servitude allowing it to
enter the place of use by virtue of a treaty right to fish at all usual and accustomed places.
Winans, 198 U.S at 381.
The United States’ and Tribe’s repeated references to this Court’s decision in Joyce
Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.2d 502 (2007), do not support their assertion
that use of the water by fish eventually harvested by the Tribe is a sufficient basis for a reserved
water right in streams not owned by the Tribe. In Joyce Livestock the Court found that ranchers
could hold water rights on lands not owned by them based on the fact that their cattle used the
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water. But Joyce Livestock is distinguishable for two reasons: first, the ranchers owned the cattle
that were using the water. Here, the Tribe does not own the fish. The tribal property interest in
the fish ceases once those fish leave tribally-owned lands, as demonstrated by the holding in
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 561, that the Crow Tribe had no legal right to prevent the
taking of wildlife on non-Indian lands within the reservation. Second, the ranchers in Joyce
Livestock, while not the owners of the federal lands where water use was occurring, had a right
to enter and use the lands by means of a federal grazing permit. Here, the United States and the
Tribe admit they do not possess the right to enter and use the place of use for these twelve water
rights. U.S. Resp. Br. 32 (“the Tribe makes not claim of a right to fish on non-tribal lands”).
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir.
2013), suggested that reserved water rights could exist outside the bounds of a federal
reservation in Alaska, but no water rights were awarded or recognized in that case. John
addressed the validity of a federal regulation implementing the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2371 (Nov. 12, 1980) (ANILCA). The regulation defined the scope
of “public lands” in Alaska to include appurtenant reserved water rights. The Court approved the
agencies’ determination that under the reserved water rights doctrine “appurtenant” waters
“included “all navigable and non-navigable water within the exterior boundaries of the [land
units] and on inland waters adjacent to the exterior boundaries of the [land units]” 720 F.3d at
1222 (brackets in original). Because the regulatory definition of “public lands” to include
appurtenant waters was used only to determine the scope of a subsistence hunting priority for
rural Alaska residents, and had no impact on other water users, the court had no occasion to
apply the Supreme Court’s admonishment in United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700-01
(1978), requiring “careful examination” of purpose and need before implying a reservation of
water. The regulation at issue simply assumed “all” waters were reserved. John, 720 F.3d at
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1222. And, the usefulness of the court’s holding for determining the scope of reserved water
rights is questionable at best, given the following admission:
[P]revious applications of the federal reserved water rights doctrine have focused
on the amount of water needed for a specific federal reservation, rather than the
locations of water sources that might generally be needed for subsistence living
from many such reservations. We, and perhaps the Secretaries, failed to
recognize the difficulties in applying the federal reserved water rights doctrine in
this novel way, and in retrospect the doctrine may provide a particularly poor
mechanism for identifying the geographic scope of ANILCA's rural subsistence
priority management when it comes to water.
720 F.2d at 1226.
More importantly, John dealt with an unqualified reservation of federal lands, with no
history comparable to the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, by which reserved lands were alienated to
homesteaders or otherwise sold in fee simple. The presence of such expressions of intent to
extinguish tribal interests in ceded or conveyed lands make John inapplicable. This is amply
demonstrated by the fact that in John, the Ninth Circuit readily implied a right to exercise federal
authority over off-reservation water resources to benefit the purposes of the reservation. But, the
same court had refused to do so in the context of Indian reservations. In Gros Ventre Tribe v.
United States, 469 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2006), the Tribe asserted that the United States had violated
its trust obligations to the Tribe by permitting a gold mine on former tribal lands that had
affected the quantity and quality of water used by the Tribe. The Tribe asserted that in its
agreements with the Tribe, “the government has committed itself to specific fiduciary obligations
in the management of water resources existing off of the Reservation.” Id. at 812. The court
refused to imply “a duty to regulate third-party use of non-Indian resources for the benefit of the
Tribes,” because “nowhere do we find the government ‘unambiguously agreeing’ to manage offReservation resources for the benefit of the Tribe.” Id. at 812-13.
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Gros Ventre confirms the central premise of the State’s appeal: when title to lands is
conveyed to non-Indians, the Court cannot imply the reservation of a right to preserve natural
resources on such lands for the Tribe’s benefit. Such a reservation of rights must be expressed
unambiguously. Here, no such right was expressed, and water rights for the purpose of
protecting fish habitat must be disallowed for all places of use not held in trust for the Coeur
d’Alene Tribe.
III.
CONCLUSION
The State requests that this case be remanded to the district court with an order to
disallow all claims for reserved water rights for hunting and fishing purposes. In the event this
Court denies such relief, the State requests, alternatively, that this case be remanded to the
district court with an order to disallow all instream flows on those twelve non-navigable streams
within the Reservation that flow entirely, or primarily, through non-Indian fee lands, as identified
in footnote 7 herein, with remand for additional consideration as to the applicability of such
holding with regard to Claim Nos. 93-7469 and 93-7470 for fish habitat water rights in Hangman
Creek.
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Addendum
United States v. Anderson, No. 72-cv-3643
Memorandum Opinion and Order
(E.D. Wash., July 23, 1979)
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